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Recent Jurisdiction Developments in the
New York Court of Appeals
Jay C. Carlisle*
This article will discuss recent developments in long-arm
jurisdiction under CPLR section 3021 and two related New York
Court of Appeals decisions.  Specifically, the article will address
Fischbarg v. Doucet,2 which presents the court’s expansive view
of long-arm jurisdiction in light of recent technological develop-
ments,3 and Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz,4 in which the court’s decision
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; Member, New York State
Law Revision Commission.  Professor Carlisle would like to thank Meghan Mar-
shall, Michael A. Stevens, and the Pace Law Review for their assistance with this
article.
1. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 2001 & Supp. 2009).  Section 302 of the
CPLR is New York’s long-arm statute. 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., NEW YORK
CIVIL PRACTICE CPLR ¶ 302.00, at 3-57 (2d ed. 2004).  It allows New York State
courts to assert jurisdiction over non-domiciliary persons and foreign corporations
incapable of being served within New York, but which have the necessary contacts
with the state that are listed in section 302. See id.  Such a defendant may be
served in New York pursuant to CPLR 313. See id. ¶ 313.00.  Personal jurisdiction
pursuant to section 302 is limited by the terms of section 302 as well as constitu-
tional considerations. See id. ¶¶ 302.00-.01.  CPLR 302 is a “restricted” long-arm
statute in that it does not go as far as is constitutionally permissible. Id. ¶ 302.00,
at 3-57.  For a thorough historical discussion of the origins of CPLR 302, see
Adolph Homburger, The Reach of New York’s Long-Arm Statute: Today and To-
morrow, 15 BUFF. L. REV. 61 (1966). See also Jay C. Carlisle, New York Civil Prac-
tice, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 343, 361-67 (1991) [hereinafter Carlisle, New York]
(describing basis for general jurisdiction under CPLR 301 and reach of long-arm
jurisdiction under CPLR 302); Jay C. Carlisle, Civil Practice, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV.
75, 98-106 (1988) (same).
2. 880 N.E.2d 22 (N.Y. 2007).
3. See id. at 26-29. See also Patrick M. Connors, The Golden Age of Personal
Jurisdiction, N.Y. L.J., May 19, 2008, at 3, col. 1.  For a discussion of the Second
417
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to limit long-arm jurisdiction was rejected by subsequent legis-
lation, signaling a more expansive application of CPLR 302 in
the future.5
I. Jurisdiction in New York
A New York State court cannot render a valid, binding
judgment without jurisdiction.6  Jurisdiction consists of subject
matter jurisdiction (competence to entertain a claim or claims),7
in personam jurisdiction (power over the person or property),8
and proper notice.9  All three components are necessary for a
court to assert jurisdiction.10  Subject matter jurisdiction and
proper notice will not be discussed in this article.
If the defendant is domiciled, incorporated, or licensed to do
business in New York, a New York court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over that defendant.11  Jurisdiction over the prop-
erty includes both in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction.12  The
former occurs when the litigation involves property within the
territorial boundaries of New York.13  The latter occurs when a
non-domiciliary’s property within the State is attached to ob-
Circuit’s interpretation of CPLR 302 with regard to electronic communication, see
Jay C. Carlisle, Second Circuit 2000-2001 Personal Jurisdiction Developments, 21
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 15, 33-39 (2001).
4. 881 N.E.2d 830 (N.Y. 2007).
5. Libel Terrorism Protection Act, ch. 66, § 3, 2008 N.Y. Laws 66 (codified as
amended at N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(d) (McKinney Supp. 2009)); Ehrenfeld, 881 N.E.2d
at 833-38.
6. See Kagen v. Kagen, 236 N.E.2d 475, 477-79 (N.Y. 1968); 2 WEINSTEIN ET
AL., supra note 1, ¶ 301.01, at 3-8.
7. See Lacks v. Lacks, 359 N.E.2d 384, 387-88 (N.Y. 1976); Gager v. White,
432 N.Y.S.2d 388 (App. Div. 1980); 1 CIVIL PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN NEW YORK
§ 9:1 (Philip M. Halpern et al. eds., 2000); 2 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, ¶
301.02.
8. See Banco Ambrosiano, S.P.A. v. Artoc Bank & Trust Ltd., 464 N.E.2d 432,
434-55 (N.Y. 1984); 2 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 301.00.
9. See Macchia v. Russo, 496 N.E.2d 680, 681-82 (N.Y. 1986); DAVID D.
SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 58, at 83 (4th ed. 2005); 2 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra
note 1, ¶ 301.04.
10. 2 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 301.01, at 3-8.
11. See SIEGEL, supra note 9, §§ 80-82, at 138-43; id. § 95, at 170; 2 WEINSTEIN
ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 301.00, at 3-6.
12. SIEGEL, supra note 9, § 101, at 179; 2 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, ¶
301.00, at 3-7.
13. See SIEGEL, supra note 9, § 101, at 179; 2 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1,
¶ 301.00, at 3-7.
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tain a basis for jurisdiction in a cause of action not directly re-
lated to the property.14  These traditional grounds for
jurisdiction, referred to as general jurisdiction,15 were devel-
oped prior to the adoption of the CPLR and were subsequently
incorporated into CPLR 301.16
Specific jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 permits New
York courts to assert long-arm jurisdiction over non-domiciliary
individuals and corporations that are not subject to general ju-
risdiction.17  Jurisdiction under CPLR 302 is, however, re-
stricted to the contacts listed in the statute,18 and the claim
over which jurisdiction is asserted must arise out of those con-
tacts.19  Moreover, the long-arm statute does not extend as far
as is constitutionally permissible.20  In addition to being con-
strained by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, long-arm jurisdiction is also restricted by article I, section
six of the New York State Constitution.21
In personam jurisdiction must be determined separately for
each cause of action asserted in the plaintiff’s complaint.22  Sim-
ilarly, a third-party plaintiff must establish personal jurisdic-
14. See SIEGEL, supra note 9, § 101, at 179-80; 2 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note
1, ¶ 301.00, at 3-7. See also Banco Ambrosiano, S.P.A. v. Artoc Bank & Trust Ltd.,
464 N.E.2d 432, 434 (N.Y. 1984) (“Prior to the Supreme Court’s expansion of the
recognized bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary, those who
wished to sue in this State often resorted to the doctrine of quasi-in-rem jurisdic-
tion to force a nondomiciliary defendant to litigate a claim in a forum where the
defendant happened to own property.”).
15. See 2 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 301.00, at 3-6; Carlisle, New York,
supra note 1, at 361.
16. See 2 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 301.00, at 3-6; Carlisle, New York,
supra note 1, at 361. See also Vincent Alexander, ‘Doing Business’ Jurisdiction:
Some Unresolved Issues, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 19, 2001, at 3, col. 1.
17. See 1 CIVIL PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 7, §§ 9:1, 9:13; 2 WEIN-
STEIN ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 302.00, at 3-57.
18. See 2 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 302.00, at 3-57; Connors, supra
note 3.
19. See McGowan v. Smith, 419 N.E.2d 321, 323 (N.Y. 1983); Williams v. En-
terprise Rent-A-Car of Boston, Inc., 826 N.Y.S.2d 59, 60 (App. Div. 2006); 2 WEIN-
STEIN ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 302.00, at 3-57.
20. Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 522 N.E.2d 40, 46 (N.Y. 1988); Talbot v.
Johnson Newspaper Corp., 522 N.E.2d 1027, 1027 (N.Y. 1988); SIEGEL, supra note
9, § 84, at 144; 2 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 302.00, at 3-57.
21. See Carlisle, New York, supra note 1, at 346 (citing Sharrock v. Dell Buick-
Cadillac, Inc., 379 N.E.2d 1169 (N.Y. 1978)).
22. See 1 CIVIL PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 7, §§ 9:1, 9:13; 2 WEIN-
STEIN ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 302.03, at 3-66.
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tion over a third-party defendant on an impleader action and
over a co-defendant on a cross-claim action.23  Courts have con-
siderable leeway in deciding a motion to dismiss for personal
jurisdiction and, if the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of
jurisdiction, may order “jurisdictional discovery” under CPLR
3211(d).24
II. Current Long-Arm Developments
A. Fischbarg v. Doucet
In Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc. v. Montana Board of In-
vestments,25 the Court of Appeals acknowledged that “techno-
logical advances in communication enable a party to transact
enormous volumes of business within a state without physically
entering it.”26  The court’s observation harkens back to a series
of its earlier cases reflecting this same principle.27  Commenta-
tors had predicted that the Court of Appeals would explicitly
reduce the importance of presence indicating contacts by find-
ing that it is immaterial whether the non-resident defendant
ever entered New York to transact business.28  Finally, in De-
23. See SIEGEL, supra note 9, § 58, at 83; id. § 80, at 138; 2 WEINSTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 1, ¶ 302.03, at 3-66.
24. See Peterson v. Spartan Industries, 310 N.E.2d 513, 514-15 (N.Y. 1974);
2 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 302.01, at 3-59 to -60.  Ultimately, the plaintiff
must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.  2 WEINSTEIN ET
AL., supra note 1, ¶ 302.00, at 3-59; Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 973, 974 (2006).  In making the prima facie determination, New
York courts should consider the pleadings and affidavits in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. See SIEGEL, supra note 9, § 93, at 168-69; Paul H. Aloe,
Civil Practice, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 713, 740 (2008).
25. 850 N.E.2d 1140 (N.Y. 2006).
26. Id. at 1142-43.  Specifically, the Court of Appeals in Deutsche Bank held
that a sophisticated institutional trader who never physically entered New York in
any way did, in fact, transact business in the state by initiating communications
with a New York securities broker through an electronic instant messaging service
when agreeing to sell fifteen million dollars in bonds. See id. at 1141-43.  Recent
New York trial court decisions build on the Court of Appeals’ pronouncement in
analyzing jurisdiction in the context of electronic communications. See Mark A.
Berman, Long-Arm Jurisdiction, E-mail and Web Sites, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 31, 2009,
at 5, col. 1.
27. Deutsche Bank, 850 N.E.2d at 1143 (citing Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. Univ. of
Houston, 404 N.E.2d 726 (N.Y. 1980); Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn,
256 N.E.2d 506 (N.Y. 1970)).
28. See OSCAR G. CHASE & ROBERT A. BARKER, CIVIL LITIGATION IN NEW YORK
§ 1.06, at 55 (2d ed. 1990) (questioning “whether physical presence should be a sine
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cember 2007, the Court of Appeals acted.  In Fischbarg v. Dou-
cet,29 the Court of Appeals unanimously agreed to exercise long-
arm jurisdiction, pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1), over two Califor-
nian defendants who had retained the plaintiff attorney to re-
present them in a lawsuit litigated in Oregon.30
In Fischbarg, one of the defendants, the president of a Cali-
fornia corporation, telephoned the plaintiff, an attorney in New
York, to discuss a potential claim against an Oregon corpora-
tion.31  The defendant then sent a letter to the plaintiff confirm-
ing that he would represent her company on a contingency fee
basis. The defendant enclosed “contracts, copyrighted material,
[an] outline of events, and copies of correspondence for plain-
tiff’s review.”32  When the California corporation was sued in
the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, the
plaintiff was admitted to practice pro hac vice and represented
the corporation from his office in New York City.33  The plaintiff
took depositions, conducted court conferences, and even argued
a summary judgment motion by telephone from his New York
office.34  Ultimately, the plaintiff sent the defendant a bill for
approximately $60,000.35  The representation terminated when
the defendants disputed the plaintiff’s fees.36  The plaintiff tried
to collect his fees by filing an application with the Oregon dis-
trict court, but his claim was dismissed.37  He then commenced
an action against the California defendants in the Supreme
Court of New York County.38  The defendants made a pre-an-
swer motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds
qua non in an age in which presence through electronic means is for many pur-
poses as effective as a visit to New York” (emphasis added)).
29. 880 N.E.2d 22 (N.Y. 2007). Fischbarg was handed down simultaneously
with Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830 (N.Y. 2007), and reflects the multi-
jurisdictional nature of law practice in the new electronic technological age. See
Connors, supra note 3.
30. See Fischbarg, 880 N.E.2d at 24.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 25.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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that they did not have minimum contacts with New York, which
the trial court dismissed.39
Based on these facts, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
prior 3-2 decision by the Appellate Division for the First Depart-
ment,40 which had found the defendants subject to jurisdiction
under CPLR 302(a)(1) because the dispute arose out of a busi-
ness transaction within New York.41  The Court of Appeals ap-
plied the criteria set forth in Deutsche Bank, deciding first that
the defendants had purposefully availed themselves “ ‘of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’”42  The de-
fendants’ lack of physical presence in New York was entirely
irrelevant.43  The quality and nature of the defendants’ elec-
tronic contacts with the state was sufficient to reasonably con-
clude that they had deliberately reached out to the plaintiff in
New York to derive benefits from his representation of them in
Oregon.44
Further, the court held that there was a “substantial rela-
tionship” between the defendants’ activities and the plaintiff’s
claim.45  The defendants’ conversations with the New York
39. Id. at 26.
40. Id. at 30.
41. See Fischbarg v. Doucet, 832 N.Y.S.2d 164, 167-69 (App. Div. 2007).
42. Fischbarg, 880 N.E.2d at 26 (quoting McKee Elec. Co. v Rauland-Borg
Corp., 229 N.E.2d 604, 607 (N.Y. 1967)).
43. Id. at 27 (citing Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v Franklyn, 256 N.E.2d 506,
508 (N.Y. 1970)). See also id. at 26 (“CPLR 302(a)(1) jurisdiction is proper ‘even
though the defendant never enters New York, so long as the defendant’s activities
here were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transac-
tion and the claim asserted.’” (quoting Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v Montana Bd. of
Invs., 850 N.E.2d 1140, 1142 (N.Y. 2006))).
44. Id. at 27-28.
45. Id. at 29-30.  Similarly, a New York trial court recently upheld jurisdiction
in a case in which a Netherlands corporation and its agents had initiated phone
calls and e-mail messages to the plaintiff in New York, had attended meetings in
New York, and where the loan at issue was prepared and negotiated in New York.
Berman, supra note 26 (citing NA Parnassus B.V. v. Ornelas-Hernandez, No.
600997/08, at 4 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 27, 2009)).  In contrast,
a trial court recently found that electronic communications and a single
meeting in New York were too minimal for defendant to have reasonably
anticipated being hauled into court in New York, where the subject agree-
ment was not negotiated or to be performed in New York, and the parties
conferred by e-mail, express mail and telephone from their respective for-
eign residences.
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plaintiff attorney focused directly on his work in representing
the defendants, which therefore demonstrated that his claim
arose out of the business transaction in New York.46  Thus, the
“arising out of” requirement was met.47  For the above reasons,
the court also found that it would not violate fundamental no-
tions of due process and fairness to subject the defendants to
jurisdiction in New York “because they should have reasonably
expected to defend against a suit based on their relationship
with plaintiff in New York.”48
Fischbarg, however, does not provide the clarity that some
assume it does.49  The decision does not explain precisely what
level of communication is necessary to constitute a transaction
of business.  Unlike the Court of Appeals decision in Parke-Ber-
net Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn,50 it is not clear from Fischbarg
what and how many contacts between a client and his or her
attorney are sufficient to provide a basis for jurisdiction.51  For
example, can jurisdiction be established where a Californian cli-
Id. (citing Shahidsaless v. Ebadi, No. 115835/07 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 12, 2009)).
46. Fischbarg, 880 N.E.2d at 29-30.
47. See id. at 30. See also McGowan v. Smith, 419 N.E.2d 321, 323 (N.Y.
1981) (“Essential to the maintenance of a suit against a nondomiciliary under
CPLR 302 . . . is the existence of some articulable nexus between the business
transacted and the cause of action sued upon.”).
48. Fischbarg, 880 N.E.2d at 30.
49. See Connors, supra note 3 (“[T]he result in future cases may be less pre-
dictable if the lawyer initiates the attorney-client relationship through permissible
advertising and solicitation, the client’s contacts with New York are minimal, or
the client is not a sophisticated user of legal services.  As the Court conceded, ‘it is
impossible to precisely fix those acts that constitute a transaction of business’ giv-
ing rise to long-arm jurisdiction in New York.”).  In a recent New York trial court
decision on a motion to dismiss, the court, utilizing a veil-piercing theory,
upheld jurisdiction on a claim for legal fees, notwithstanding that neither
defendant had signed a retainer agreement with plaintiff New York counsel
and the corporate defendant’s offices were registered in the British Virgin
Islands, and that such defendant did no business in New York, and did not
maintain offices, employ personnel or have a corporate bank account in New
York.
Berman, supra note 26 (citing John E. Osborn, P.C. v. Jasper Int’l Bus. Inc., No.
601190/08 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 12, 2009)).
50. 256 N.E.2d 506 (N.Y. 1970).  In Parke-Bernet, the Court of Appeals en-
gaged in a very detailed analysis of the facts of the case and how they supported a
finding of valid long-arm jurisdiction. See id. at 507-09.  This analysis is explained
in detail below.
51. Compare Fischbarg 880 N.E.2d at 26-30, with Parke-Bernet, 256 N.E.2d at
507-09. See also infra notes 52-58.
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ent enters into a retainer agreement with a New York attorney
through telephone or e-mail?  Moreover, how much “litigation
activity” must the lawyer conduct on behalf of the client?  Does
it matter if the activity is conducted within New York or else-
where?  Is one contact sufficient or must there be a series of
contacts to constitute a transaction of business?  While these
and other questions remain unresolved, New York courts have
provided some guidance.
For example, in Parke-Bernet, the defendant, a California
resident, had actively participated in a New York auction run
by the plaintiff through an open telephone line.52  His bids were
relayed to an employee of the plaintiff, who announced them to
other bidders in the auction room.53  The defendant bid success-
fully on two items but did not honor the purchase when the
plaintiff demanded payment.54  As a result, the plaintiff initi-
ated an action against the defendant in the New York County
Supreme Court.55
The Court of Appeals held that although the defendant only
completed a single transaction, the requirements of CPLR
302(a)(1) were satisfied.56  The court accepted the plaintiff’s ar-
gument that the defendant had projected himself into New York
through his participation in the bidding via telephone.57  View-
ing the defendant’s direct and personal involvement in the auc-
tion by open telephone line as sufficient to establish “presence,”
the court found that such “presence,” coupled with active partic-
ipation in the bidding process, amounted to the sustained and
substantial transaction of business in New York.58
It is possible that the nature and frequency of the commu-
nications to New York will be a determinative factor in evaluat-
ing jurisdictional issues in such cases.  For example, in Ehrlich-
52. 256 N.E.2d at 507.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 508.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 508-09. But see M. Katz & Son Billiard Prods., Inc. v. G. Correale &
Sons, Inc., 270 N.Y.S.2d 672, 673 (App. Div. 1966) (holding that defendant, a New
Jersey corporation, did not transact business when its employee ordered goods via
telephone from the New York plaintiff).
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Bober & Co. v. University of Houston,59 jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant was sustained on the basis of telephone calls
made to New York that were coupled with transactions between
the parties—some of which were made when the defendant’s
representative came to the plaintiff’s New York office.60  Relying
on Ehrlich-Bober, the Appellate Division has held that CPLR
302(a)(1) jurisdiction existed over a stockbroker’s Alabama cus-
tomer who placed orders via telephone and mail but never phys-
ically entered New York.61  Similarly, in Otterbourg, Steindler,
Houston & Rosen, P.C. v. Shreve City Apartments, Ltd.,62 which
involved a fee dispute between a law firm and client,63 the Ap-
pellate Division held that the defendant’s extensive communica-
tions via telephone and letter with the plaintiff (totaling ninety-
three contacts) were sufficient to constitute a transaction of
business under CPLR 302(a)(1).64
59. 404 N.E.2d 726 (N.Y. 1980).
60. See id. at 731.
61. L.F. Rothschild, Unterberg, Towbin v. Thompson, 433 N.Y.S.2d 6, 7 (App.
Div. 1980). But see L.F. Rothschild, Unterberg, Towbin v. McTamney, 452
N.Y.S.2d 630, 631-32 (App. Div. 1982) (rejecting assertion of jurisdiction over a
Pennsylvania defendant whose several telephone conversations with a New York
broker resulted in a single purchase order).
62. 543 N.Y.S.2d 978 (App. Div. 1989).
63. Id. at 980.
64. Id. at 981. See also Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 522 N.E.2d 40, 43
(N.Y. 1988) (“With the growth of national markets for commercial trade and tech-
nological advances in communication and travel systems, however, an enormous
volume of business may be transacted within a State without a party ever entering
it. . . . So long as a party avails itself of the benefits of the forum, has sufficient
minimum contacts with it, and should reasonably expect to defend its actions
there, due process is not offended if that party is subjected to jurisdiction even if
not ‘present’ in that State.”); Black River Assocs. v. Newman, 637 N.Y.S.2d 880
(App. Div. 1996) (holding that a Californian defendant who contracted to purchase
real property was subject to jurisdiction in New York even though he never en-
tered the state but conducted negotiations by telephone). But see Libra Global
Tech. Servs. v. Telemedia Int’l, Ltd., 719 N.Y.S.2d 53 (App. Div. 2001) (holding
that a video conference where the parties negotiated part of a contract did not
amount to transacting business under CPLR 302(a)(1)); Concrete Pipe & Prods.
Corp. v. Modern Bldg. Materials, Inc., 624 N.Y.S.2d 496, 497 (App. Div. 1995) (“It
is well established that a foreign defendant whose only contact with New York is
the purchase of goods by telephone or mail from a New York plaintiff is not subject
to long-arm jurisdiction.”).
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B. Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz
In Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz,65 the New York Court of Ap-
peals held that long-arm jurisdiction did not extend to lawsuits
against foreign litigants by New York victims of libel tourism.66
The plaintiff, a New York author, published a book in the
United States accusing the defendant, a Saudi Arabian busi-
nessman, of supporting terrorism.67  A small number of the
books were purchased in England through the Internet, and the
defendant filed suit in London against the author for libel.68
The defendant obtained a default judgment against the plain-
tiff, who failed to appear in the case.69  The plaintiff then sued
the defendant in the Southern District of New York to have the
foreign judgment declared unenforceable in the United States.70
The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim, arguing
that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because his
contacts with New York were limited to providing the plaintiff,
through mail and e-mail, with information regarding the for-
eign libel case and posting the English court’s order on his web-
site, which was accessible in New York.71
The district court subsequently granted the defendant’s
motion to dismiss,72 holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction
over the defendant.73  The plaintiff appealed this decision to the
Second Circuit, which certified the inquiry to the New York
Court of Appeals.74  The Court of Appeals resolved the issue by
holding that the contacts did not constitute a “transaction of
business” under CPLR 302(a)(1) because the defendant neither
purposefully availed himself of the privileges and benefits of
New York law nor sought to establish a business relationship
with the plaintiff.75
65. 881 N.E.2d 830 (N.Y. 2007).
66. See id. at 834-38.
67. Id. at 831-32.
68. Id. at 832.
69. Id. at 832-33.
70. Id. at 833.
71. See id. at 834-35.
72. Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, No. 04 Civ. 9641(RCC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23423, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2006).
73. See id. at *9-14.
74. Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 489 F.3d 542, 551 (2d Cir. 2007).
75. Ehrenfeld, 881 N.E.2d at 838.
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The New York State Legislature has since overturned
Ehrenfeld by enacting a new subdivision (d) to CPLR 302.76
Specifically, CPLR 302(d) provides:
The courts of this state shall have personal jurisdic-
tion over any person who obtains a judgment in a defa-
mation proceeding outside the United States against
any person who is a resident of New York or is a per-
son or entity amenable to jurisdiction in New York
who has assets in New York or may have to take ac-
tions in New York to comply with the judgment, for
the purposes of rendering declaratory relief with re-
spect to that person’s liability for the judgment, and/or
for the purpose of determining whether said judgment
should be deemed non-recognizable pursuant to sec-
tion fifty-three hundred four of this chapter, to the ful-
lest extent permitted by the United States
Constitution provided: 1. the publication at issue was
published in New York, and 2. that resident or person
amenable to jurisdiction in New York (i) has assets in
New York which might be used to satisfy the foreign
defamation judgment, or (ii) may have to take actions
in New York to comply with the foreign defamation
judgment.  The provisions of this subdivision shall ap-
ply to persons who obtained judgments in defamation
proceedings outside the United States prior to and/or
after the effective date of this subdivision.77
As a result, jurisdiction can now be established over foreign de-
fendants in circumstances like those present in Ehrenfeld.78
The question of whether the New York State nexus require-
ments in this new section are constitutional remains unan-
swered.79  It has been argued that this statute may be too
expansive and exceed constitutional restrictions on assertion of
basis jurisdiction.80  Also, a literal reading of CPLR 302(d) may
give rise to “reverse libel tourism.”81  This means that any au-
76. Libel Terrorism Protection Act, ch. 66, § 3, 2008 N.Y. Laws 66 (codified as
amended at N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(d) (McKinney Supp. 2009)).
77. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(d).
78. See Paul H. Aloe, Unraveling Libel Tourism, N.Y. L.J., June 18, 2008, at 4,
col. 4.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
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thor with enough contacts and assets in New York may there-
fore be able to sue a foreign libel judgment holder.82
III. Conclusion
The Court of Appeals’ recent holding in Fishbarg repre-
sents the court’s commitment to expansive application of New
York’s long-arm statute in response to new technology.83  This
will likely have the effect of subjecting many more non-domicili-
ary defendants to jurisdiction in New York.  Moreover, the Leg-
islature’s swift response in remedying the defects in the
Ehrenfeld decision demonstrates that any reluctance the court
has to extending the reach of New York’s long-arm statute may
be rectified legislatively.84
82. Id. Professor Aloe explains:
A party who is libeled can generally bring suit in any jurisdiction in which
the libelous statement may have been published.  Effectively, with modern
commerce, this means that a libel plaintiff can choose to sue virtually any-
where the work may have been sold.  The effect and intent of these tactics is
to strip U.S. authors of the protections they would have under U.S. law even
though the publication occurred in the United States.
Id.
83. See supra notes 29-48.
84. See supra notes 76-78.
